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The governance of biological emergencies has been an im-
portant issue during the last decade. Much policy work has 
been done on the topic, aiming at covering the necessities 
associated to bio-preparedness – ie, preparedness for bio-
logical threats. In this context, there is a lot to be said and 
understood by looking at emerging biological entities, such 
as new viruses or bacteria. Some of the most important in-
ternational organizations worry about this issue: The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO), or European Union (EU) have specific sections 
specialized in dealing with this matter. Such concern has 
been fed by the expert opinion asserting that a big pan-
demic is imminent. This is based on several developments 
that have taken place during the last decades: the 80s saw 
the expansion of Ebola and HIV, and the 90s and 2000s wit-
nessed the appearance of the Creutzfeld-Jacob’s disease, se-
vere acute respiratory syndrome (SRAS), and different types 
of influenza viruses coming from other species, such as the 
avian influenza or the H1N1. These outbreaks, together with 
the Anthrax attacks that took place in the aftermath of 9/11 
and the research on genetic engineering of viruses has led 
to a general state of fear of biological threats. Such events 
are characterized by a strong interaction between the social 
and the biological, between populations and viruses. I sug-
gest that conceptualizing viruses as bio-objects will be help-
ful in our attempt to understand such interaction.
The bio-objects framework, which has been developed by 
the research network “Bio-objects and their Boundaries: 
Governing Matters at the Intersection of Society, Science 
and Politics” (1,2) has provided an interesting way of think-
ing about emerging biological entities. A number of anal-
yses with different biological entities have already been 
reported in this same journal. MicroRNA’s (3), dried blood 
spots (4), genetically modified insects (5), transgenic food 
(6), or HeLa cells (7) serve as examples. Such variety of 
work shows the versatility of the concept. In an attempt 
to understand the dynamic processes that give raise 
and regulate emerging biological entities, the concept 
provides a theoretical and methodological tool useful to 
explore new fields related to biology and life sciences.
In this article I will claim that the bio-objects framework is a 
useful tool to connect some biological dimensions of bio-
security with the political and the social. The framework is 
beneficial when we aim at tracking and following biologi-
cal entities that are controversial and subject to change. 
Controversies are common in the area of biosecurity, an 
area that embraces institutional entities situated in the in-
tersection of science, economy, security, law, society, and 
politics. It is within this background that viruses need to 
be understood nowadays: as objects that transgress ex-
isting boundaries and classifications while their identity is 
continually challenged. They are, in that sense, suitable to 
be understood as bio-objects. I will try to illustrate these 
ideas using a recent controversy on the consequences of 
genetic engineering on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influen-
za (HPAI) A/H5N1, a virus that appeared in 1997 in South-
east Asia and that has been threatening to overcome the 
human/animal interface since then. By following research 
articles, pieces of news and reports, I have carried out an 
exploratory analysis that intends to understand viruses as 
immersed in a bio-objectification process.
SoCiAl reSeArCh on bioSeCurity
Three different sources are considered by biosecurity poli-
cymakers: a) natural outbreaks, b) bioterrorism, and c) lab-
oratory accidents. What is interesting about this 3-fold in-
teraction is that the three of them incorporate disparate 
rationalities coming from different sociopolitical practices. 
While natural outbreaks are usually a public health issue, 
bioterrorist attacks are a civil defense and national security 
concern. The former is in deep relation with medicine and 
epidemiology, the latter with military forms of thought. 
This interaction is deeply related to United States (US) 
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politics where, during the last quarter of the 20th century, 
diseases that were approached exclusively as medical is-
sues became an issue for national security too (8). The third 
rationality mentioned is the one of laboratory accidents, 
mainly represented by accidental releases. This is regulat-
ed through biosafety rules, which are guided by the WHO, 
leaving the responsibility scattered among scientists, re-
search institutions, and funding organizations. This third 
rationality interacts with the two previous ones by incor-
porating a controversial dilemma: life sciences research en-
tails threat and progress in the same activity.
The interaction of these three rationalities is also a source of 
controversy in the field of biosecurity as it integrates differ-
ent institutions and disciplines that have a common inter-
est but that have historically had different objectives. The 
emergence of an infectious agent in the population is han-
dled through policies that fall under the umbrella of bios-
ecurity, a wide term that enrolls many institutions that work 
in different political disciplines. This implicates that a given 
outbreak is understood under the light of military, health, 
and research rationalities at the same time (Figure 1).
Policies pick up this biological threat and are developed 
discursively in a state of uncertainty, risk, threat, and fear. 
These four ideas are in the core of any anticipation of a bio-
logical emergency. In that state of alert, a biological event 
is expected to happen, though we do not know when, 
where, or how. Threat and fear are instituted as the new 
normality (9) and biosecurity scenarios (10) are the only 
way to evaluate future events. This alert attitude needs to 
be maintained in order to be prepared to act in front of 
an emergency. A constant state of uncertainty brings in 
deep difficulties for governance processes. As future hap-
penings are uncertain, effective policymaking becomes an 
extremely difficult task, if possible at all. In cases of socio-
technical controversy, the higher the stakes are, the less 
certainty is allowed (11). As the consequences of a biologi-
cal event are hardly predictable but usually categorized 
as “devastating,” some experts and policymakers feel the 
need of preparing for any possibility, no matter what the 
probabilities of the event may be.
Under the effect of such discourses, biosecurity policies 
enter the field of bio-preparedness. In front of an unknown 
threat they adopt the perspective of what is called an “all 
hazards approach.” Countries need to get themselves ready 
for any kind of possible threat. Calculations and probabili-
ties seem to be left out here: a distant possibility, because 
of its potential effect, is taken as a very close one. In this 
context, the logics of biosecurity move from prevention to 
precaution and to preparedness (12). The first one, preven-
tion, linked to veterinary practices, relies on data of preva-
lence and incidence: it is a rationality of cases and propa-
gation zones and knowing the enemy means being able 
to fight it. Precaution, on the other hand, pays attention to 
the limitations of knowledge. In such a case, the possibility 
of a trustable prediction is put in doubt, opening space for 
public deliberation. Finally, preparedness blurs knowledge 
and focuses directly on the potential consequences of an 
event. It is not that the new rationality erases the previ-
ous one, but it limits its sphere of application. The lack of 
knowledge in preparedness is dealt through scenario de-
velopment and simulation, where fiction and reality meet 
(13). As fiction easily tends to overcome reality, the influ-
ence of fiction-based risk assessment is much more pro-
found than knowledge-based risk assessment. Hence, poli-
cies and funding seem to shift their interest more toward 
preparedness than toward prevention.
Preparedness policies are built in a context characterized 
by the on-the-making processes that flood biosecurity 
controversies and are characterized by constant develop-
ment. They are deeply rooted in the idea that prepared-
ness is continuous (13); it is not seen as a final objective 
but as an ongoing process that can hardly be closed 
down. As these features are part of the most basic ideas 
laid down under such policies, they deploy what I call 
“standby policies.” These policies are designed to 
Figure 1. the three sources of threat for biosecurity policies 
and their respective rationalities.
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cover future events but they cannot be implemented un-
less such events happen. They are developed in a symbolic 
hypothetical context. Still, they have an actual effect in life 
governance while their formulation remains virtual (14).
Such discourses give meaning to the current state of af-
fairs of research on emerging infectious diseases (EIDs). The 
controversy analyzed here cannot be understood as an iso-
lated case, but as a consequence of decades of political, 
social, and scientific activity.
the mutAnt Flu ControverSy (15,16)
In September 2011, Ron Fouchier and his team, from the Er-
asmus Medical Center in the Netherlands, reported at the 
European Scientific Working Group on Influenza’s confer-
ence in Malta having pushed certain mutations in the long 
time known A/H5N1 Influenza virus. These mutations made 
the virus able to be transmitted among ferrets, the most 
used animal model in human Influenza research. Concur-
rently, Yoshihiro Kawaoka, who runs two biolaboratories, 
one at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and another 
one at the University of Tokyo, carried out similar research 
with similar conclusions. Both researches were funded by 
the US government. Papers reporting on the results were 
sent to leading journals: Fouchier’s to Science and Kawao-
ka’s to Nature. But before publication, the National Science 
Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), the US institution 
competent in the matter, reviewed both papers to evalu-
ate their implications related to dual-use research concerns. 
The papers were evaluated during October 2011 and a de-
cision was made public in December: the papers would be 
published with redaction of the methodological design in 
order to avoid potential misuse of the mutant virus. Access 
to all the details of the research would be provided to cer-
tain authorized researchers. The publication was scheduled 
to take place during March 2012. As part of the controversy, 
a 60-day moratorium on HPAI H5N1 research was declared 
on January 2012, which finally lasted more than one year, 
until February 2013. The objective of such moratorium was 
“to provide time to explain the public health benefits of this 
work, to describe the measures in place to minimize pos-
sible risks, and to enable organizations and governments 
around the world to review their policies” (17). During that 
time, in February 2012, a new meeting between WHO and 
NSABB members took place. The result of such meeting was 
that both papers needed to be published fully. The argu-
ments that led to this decision were the need to stimu-
late public health research and the difficulty on deciding 
who would and would not have access to the non-
redacted material. A final meeting between the NSABB and 
the authors took place in March 2012 in order to revise the 
final drafts. At last, by June 22, 2012, both papers had been 
published (18,19).
The controversy was mainly fed by the discussion on the 
potential risks and benefits of H5N1 gain-of-function re-
search. So, the first questions asked were related to how 
dangerous or beneficial the research actually was. On the 
one hand, the ability to make H5N1 transmissible in mam-
mals could be used by bioterrorists and the fail of biosafety 
techniques could provoke an accidental release of the virus. 
On the other hand, knowing how the virus might develop 
can help to assess the threat posed by viruses sampled from 
wild or farm animals and human confirmed cases. Another 
source of problems that fed the controversy was the legal 
and political framework that surrounded it. US law did not 
allow redacting the research partly: it had to be published 
fully or classified. Also, politically, it raised problems at the 
international level. The Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
(PIP) Framework, run by the WHO, is a program that engages 
many countries and it is considered a basic tool for Influenza 
preparedness. Not sharing this information with the rest of 
the members of the PIP could be seen as problematic, mo-
tivating some countries to fall off the program (as Indonesia 
had done in front of another polemical situation regarding 
the fabrication of Influenza vaccines in 2006) (20).
The controversy was solved/silenced thanks to the final 
decision about how the research articles should be pub-
lished. But consequences were to follow. US carried out 
policy changes that now allow government officers to 
review and monitor biological research implicating any 
pathogen present on the list of 15 biological entities of po-
tential dual-use concern. US government is also allowed, 
under such policy changes, to modify the methodological 
design and the conduct of US funded research.
the A/h5n1 inFluenZA viruS AS A bio-obJeCt: the 
bio-obJeCtiFiCAtion ProCeSS
The A/H5N1 Influenza was first detected among humans 
in 1997. Since then, the virus has been identified as causing 
zoonotic disease. In the period from the beginning of 2003 
to October 8, 2013, 641 laboratory cases were reported to 
the WHO, 380 of them being lethal (21). H5N1 has been 
a pandemic threat for about 16 years now. Its stability as 
an object has been subjected to the emergence of new 
mutations, to peaks in its contagiousness on humans or 
animals, and to public controversies. The so-called “mutant 
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flu” controversy has been one of those moments when sta-
bility becomes compromised and the bio-objectification 
process becomes visible and suitable to be analyzed.
As we take a closer look to the experiments carried out by 
Fouchier and Kawaoka, the identity held by A/H5N1 is al-
ready fragmented as different samples need to be sepa-
rately identified. For example, Fouchier experimented with 
the virus A/Indonesia/5/2005 and Kawaoka with the A/
Vietnam/1203/2004. These names serve already as identi-
fier that stabilizes the sample (22), as an object susceptible 
of being collected, stored, and shipped. Being the samples 
already linked to the time and place of their collection, mu-
tation in the laboratory implicates a new identity already: 
the virus result of biotechnological labor will differ from 
the original sample. We need to also acknowledge that 
such identities are not equally relevant for everyone: such 
fragmentation of the main H5N1 identity is relevant for ex-
perts but not entirely for other milieus. For example, most 
journalists, lay people, and politicians will keep referring to 
the virus using the name H5N1.
The bio-objectification process starts to be evident inside 
the controversy as the sample is transported from a biobank 
in Hong Kong to a biolaboratory in Amsterdam, in the case 
of Fouchier, and from Vietnam to the US, in the case of 
Kawaoka. After such process, biotechnological labor is car-
ried out. Both samples are submitted to modifications in or-
der to potentiate their capability to be transmitted among 
mammals. In the case of Fouchier, by genetically modifying 
the virus using site-directed mutagenesis and subsequent 
serial passage in ferrets, the virus was able to be transmitted 
among ferrets. Furthermore, such material changes also af-
fected the pathogenicity of the virus. Besides the ability of 
transmission, the fatality was drastically reduced and none 
of the recipient ferrets died after airborne infection with the 
mutant A/H5N1 viruses. In the case of Kawaoka, the team 
identified a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus. This was a com-
bination of H5N1 and an H1N1 sample from the 2009 pan-
demic influenza outbreak. Such reassortant was capable 
of droplet transmission in a ferret model. Kawaoka’s virus 
replicated successfully among ferrets but was not highly 
pathogenic and did not cause mortality. The changes on 
their capacities are central to understand the controver-
sy. The previous point of concern for biosecurity was the 
high pathogenicity of the A/H5N1 Influenza, and its abil-
ity to spread was the only thing keeping the virus out from 
becoming a pandemic (although it was considered a pan-
demic threat). Both mutated viruses incorporate the abil-
ity to be transmitted among humans (inferred through an 
animal model), but lose its high pathogenicity. At this point, 
the materiality and capacities of the virus have changed but 
its identity keeps being the same for a big part of the soci-
ety, including politicians and regulators.
Subsequently, regulation – a process inside the symbolic 
dimension of the bio-objectification process – is required 
as the new capabilities and materiality do not totally fit 
with the known identity of the virus. In this new regulatory 
activity, NSABB, WHO, and the journals Science and Nature, 
as well as mass media, attributed a series of features that 
will configure the identity of the object: mutant, deadly, 
or lethal are adjectives that became attached to the new 
identity of the virus. Such process has been deeply condi-
tioned by the material changes but it is not until regulatory 
agents enter the scene that the identity change starts to 
be evident, as the material change process was when the 
samples started to move. Material change is situated in the 
material dimension of the process, while identity change 
needs to be understood in the interface between the ma-
Figure 2. the bio-objectification process.
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terial and the symbolic dimension (Figure 2). Both dimen-
sions are inseparable as they are necessarily intertwined, 
but they do not share actors, practices, and spaces during 
the whole process. The final decision and regulation of the 
data related to the new agent allows the controversy to 
be solved/silenced, conferring some stability to the bio-
object and its identity.
But what are the consequences of this process? How 
does society apprehend such changes? The first inter-
esting consequence of bio-objectification processes is 
the challenging of existing classifications and boundar-
ies. Laboratory/nature becomes a relevant dichotomy for 
the configuration of the biological object. Through labo-
ratory practices, nature is anticipated. The previously un-
certain event of a natural mutation of a H5N1 Influenza 
virus is not only artificially predicted but also artificially 
enacted (the fictionalized prediction of a pandemic is, in 
a way, voluntarily pursued). Species boundaries are clear-
ly another set of barriers that is challenged by the contro-
versy. While the use of animal models, such as ferrets, is 
nothing new in biological research, the genetic engineer-
ing of the virus reminds us of the mobile barrier between 
epidemic, epizootic, and zoonotic diseases. A third cat-
egory of challenged boundaries is the one of disciplines. 
As the controversy develops, the new virus enters, discur-
sively, more and more disciplinary areas. The challenges 
for the researcher are beyond microbiology. They need to 
answer in front of the press, committees, boards, etc. The 
virus has entered the space of politics, law, international 
relationships, and security.
A second interesting consequence of such modifications is 
that the values attached to A/H5N1, as well as its own val-
ue as an object, are reevaluated. The potential identities of 
the virus imply new forms of understanding it as a threat. 
While before it was classified as a natural threat, now it is 
classified as a human-made threat – therefore avoidable to 
some extent. Value creation is always in relation to the in-
teractions of the virus with other social actors. In the prop-
er hands, the virus will acquire the proper value – ie, a posi-
tive value. Researchers will use it for public health benefit. 
In the wrong hands, it will acquire negative value as ter-
rorists could use it for nefarious purposes. But it is impor-
tant to acknowledge the uncertainty of such changes. The 
abilities to carry out genetic engineering are not so easy 
to learn and, on the other hand, laboratory accidents are 
not only dependent on the good will of researchers. So, 
whether the engineered virus will become a great op-
portunity to tackle the pandemic influenza threat or 
a great threat for the entire humanity remains unknown. 
This new potential value, still uncertain, feeds the rational-
ity of preparedness.
ConCluSionS
Thinking of biological controversies in terms of bio-objec-
tification allows us to reflect on materiality and meaning 
as processes that, far from being stable, are constantly on-
the-making. The eventual and transitory stability of bio-
logical entities is always linked to broader social processes 
that escape scientific practice. The attention paid by the 
bio-objects framework to political and, more precisely, reg-
ulatory practices, is crucial to understand the stabilization 
of bio-objects submitted to processes of biotechnologiza-
tion and their identification processes. Furthermore, the 
bio-objects framework seems to be useful in order to ana-
lyze the most molecular dimensions of biosecurity, having 
its starting point in the technical labor carried out in mi-
crobiology laboratories. This way, it helps connecting the 
practical dimensions attached to the practice of microbiol-
ogy to the political dimensions attached to policymaking 
in biosecurity.
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